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NOTES.
THE EFFECT OF THE CLAYTON ACT ON PICKETING.-The Clay-

ton Act 1 forbids an injunction in labor controversies prohibiting

"any person from attending at any place where such person may
lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to
work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or
to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advis-

ing, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do."
It was held by the Federal Supreme Court in the recent case of
Oct. i5, i914, c. 323, 38 U. S; Stat. at Large 738 (sec. 2o).

(1o0)
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American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council 2 that. under
this section picketing by even a small group was unlawful, and that
it might be enjoined as such, but that it was lawful for strikers to
have a single representative at each entrance to the plant of the
employer to announce the strike and peaceably persuade the workers to join them in it.
It is no longer a subject of controversy in any jurisdiction that
injunctive relief will be granted to employers against strikers who
seek to enforce their demands, though they be in themselves lawful,
by a system of picketing-whose purpose is the intimidation of employees or patrons by threats, assaults, or. acts of violence causing
physical injury.' Nor is it, ingeneral, necessary- to show that bodily
harm has been done any one. An injunction will be granted to restrain picketing where the intimidation of workers has been produced by the threatening attitude of the pickets,' or merely by their
abusive or insulting language5 The ground on which such relief
is granted is that the employer's right of property in his business
is being unjustifiably interfered with to his irreparable damage, and
that he and his present or prospective employees are being forcibly
deprived of their right to contract freely." So also will picketing
be enjoined where customers are compelled to withdraw their patronage by the fear, annoyance or great inconvenience caused them
by the pickets.'
Although militant picketing is thus universally condemned,
"peaceful" picketing, so called, is permitted in the great majority of
jurisdictions. Consequently, decrees enjoining militant picketing
have been limited so as to forbid only the unlawful acts of-violence
and intimidation. Thus injunctive relief will not generally be
granted to restrain picketing which is conducted in an orderly manner for the purpose either of peacefully persuading employees to
quit work,8 or of advertising the strike,' or of counting the number
of workers or conducting some other enterprise unconnected with
the operation of the employer'i business."0 Whether or not picketing is legal has been made to depend upon the manner in which it
is conducted, and if the element of intimidation-be -lacking it will
decided Dec. S, sg2x.
'Adv. Op. U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, No. -2,
'Southern Cal. Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 2w P2.. i (Cal.

Pre' Catelan v. International Federation, 188 N. Y. S. 29 (392I).
'Densten Hair Co. v. Leather Workers' Union, 129 N. E. 45o (Mast.
1921).
*Skolny v. Hillman, 187 N. Y. S. 706 (192); O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa.
236, 37 At. 843 (x897).
io86 (Tex. z92x).
'Cooks' Union v. Papageorge, 230 S.
' Local No. 313 v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86 2o5 S. NV. 45o (x918).
'Walter Wood Co. v. Toohey, 186 N. Y. S.95 (x92t).
'Ex parte Heffron, 162 S. NV. 652 (Mo. App. 1914).
" Southern Cal. Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Assn., note 3, suPra.
192);

NO TES

not be enjoined," unless the object sought to be attained by the
picketing be itself unlawful. 12
In a few jurisdictions, 3 however, picketing has been held to
be unlawful per sc. This view apparently originated in the case of
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 4 in which Holmes, J., rendered a dissenting
opinion. It was there decided that interfering with an employer's
business, either by patrolling the streets or by intimidation of
workers, should be enjoined. Other courts which have approved
his decision have extended its doctrine and enjoined strikers from
"peacefully or otherwise picketing plaintiff's plant,"" and from
maintaining a single picket stationed opposite the entrance to plaintiff's works.' 6 In such decisions the courts have proceeded upon
the theory that the act of picketing is itself illegal,'1 regardless of
the manner in which it is performed, and thus that any picketing
should be enjoined. 8 The most forceful exposition of this view
is to be found in the case of Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee,"'
where McPherson, J., delivering the opinion of the court, anticipated the attitude of the Supreme Court in the instant case. It
was there said that "peaceful picketing" was a contradiction of terms
and that "there is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing,
any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing,
or lawful lynching. When men want to converse or persuade, they
do not organize a picket line. '
In those jurisdictions which have admitted the possibility of
peaceful picketing, the test to be applied, in determining whether
or not the picketing is legal, is whether or not the element of intimidation is present20 Nor is the mere presence of strikers or patrols in the neighborhood of the plant held to constitute intimidation, even though placards are displayed or circulars are distributed
announcing the strike, and employees are peaceably urged to cease
work. 21 But it is recognized that all the circumstances of the case
must be considered in ascertaining the existence of intimidation, and
uKarges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Union, i65 Ind.
421, 75 N. E. 877 (igos).
'2Barnes v. Typographical Union, 232 111. 424, 83 N. E. 94o (go8).
Cal., Ill., Mass., Mich., N. J., Wash.
"1167 Mass. 92, 44 N E. 1077 (1896). See also Wilcutt v. Driscoll, 2oo
Mass. 11o, 120, 85 N. E. 897, 9o2 (i9o8).
"Clarage v. Luphringer, 2o2 Mich. 62, x68 N. NV. 440 (918).
"In re Langell, 178 Mich. 3o5, 144 N. AV. 841 (1913).
'Barnes v. Typographical Union, note 12, .upra; York Mfg. Co. v.
Oberdick, io Pa. Dist. R. 463 (igoi).
"Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, x56 CaL 5q, io3 Pae. 324 (19o9).
"139 Fed. 582 (C. C. i9o5).
"Walter Wood Co. v. Toohey, note 8 jupra; Jones v. Van -Winkle Gin

& Machine Vorks, 131 Ga. 336, 62 S. E. 236 (19o8).
I Ex parle Heffron, note 9, jupra.
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it has been held that tie natural timidity of those sought to be
influenced by the picketing is a proper subject of examination by
the court. 22 Yet this same test of intinidation *is the one applied by
courts that have found picketing illegal.:" By them it is recognized
that the sole purpose of picketing is to injure the employer by dissuading his employees from continuing work, and in addition they
appreciate that intimidation in some degree is an essential element
of the method employed. The mere presence in the vicinity of the
plant of numbers of pickets, whose purpose is to make as many
employees as possible quit work, is fundamentally hostile,2' 4 and inimportunity and
timidation may be caused as much by unwelcome
25
argument as by acts of physical violence.
In the Federal courts there has been a wide diversity of opinion expressed as to the legality of picketing. Some, while granting
an injunction restraining militant picketing, have accepted the proposition that peaceful picketing is unobjectionable.2 1 Others have
held intimidation to be a fundamental element of picketing, and
have restrained it in any form,2 T and in a recent case 28 a preliminary
injunction against "persuading" was granted. In a decision" under
the Clayton Act, however, peaceful picketing was approved, and the
test established was whether the acts done would be lawful if no
strike existed. This test is substantially the same as that adopted
by the Supreme Court in the instant case, but since it was there
found that picketing was unlawful in any circumstances, a different
conclusion was inevitable. In delivering the opinion of the court,
Chief Justice Taft said: "It is idle to talk of peaceful communication
in such a place and under such conditions. The number of pickets
in the groups (from four to twelve) constituted intimidation. The
name 'picket' indicated a militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceable persuasion. The crowds they drew made the passage of the
employees to and from the place of work, one of running the gauntlet. Persuasion or communication attempted in such a presence and
under such conditions was anything but peaceable and lawful." It
was found, therefore, that picketing, as in the instant case, was unlawful and was not one of those acts whose restraining by injunc'King v. Weiss Mfg. Co., 266 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. I92o).
" St. Germain v. Bakery & C. Workers! Union, 97 Wash. 2&2i 166 Pac.
665 (1917).
"St. Germain v. Bakery & C. Workers' Union, note 23 supra.
=Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Ass'n, 72 N. J. Eq. 653, 66 AtL 953 (i9o7),
affirmed: 77 N. J. Eq. 219, 79 Atl. 262 (xgo).
'Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Ruef, io Fed. io2 (C C. i902).

" Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, note i9, supra.
=Charleston Dry Dock Co. v. O'Rourke. 274 Fed. 811 (D. C. 192i).

The Clayton Act was here considered inapplicable, since unlawful acts of
violence had been committed by the strikers.
'Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co., z4o Fed. 759 (D. C. 1917).
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tion is prohibited by -the Clayton Act. Nor was the court willing to'
rely upon the discretion of the strikers themselves in determining
what constituted picketing, and in consequence limited them to one
representative at each gate of the plant.
Such a limitation seems warranted both by justice and necessity. The persuasion that the law permits in these circumstances
is such as appeals to the judgment, reason, or sentiment, and leaves
the mind free to act of its own volition. It is the persuasion of argument and not that of force. It is clear that the arguments of
strikers can be presented at one time as well by one person as by a
dozen. It is also clear that force cannot be exerted effectively by
one man, although it can by a dozen. The Supreme Court has thus
given strikers all that they are entitled to have, and also, without
prejudice to them, has made it impossible for them to overstep
the bounds of their legal rights. Experience has shown that picketing and violence are.too often concomitant to make it possible to
establish a picket line without introducing the element of intimidation, and it is to be hoped that the attitude of the Supreme Court
will commend itself to those state courts that have heretofore entertained the theoretical rather than the practical view of the objection to picketing.
P.P.
THE DOCTRINE OF REs IPSA LOQUITUR IN

PENNSYLVANIA.-

The successful harnessing of steam and electricity for industrial
and commercial purposes, and the perfection of the gasoline engine,
have surrounded us with a multitude of powerful machines and apparatus, which, though harmless in normal operation, may produce
serious bodily injury if improperly constructed or managed. It
thus becomes increasingly important that the law should place the
proper degree of responsibility for injury upon the owner or oper"ator of such apparatus. Ought the fact of injury to raise a presumption of culpability on his part? The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur answers this question in the affirmative.
Let us examine briefly the fotmdation, justification, and general scope of the doctrine, and then its limited application in Pennsylvania. The general rule in actions of negligence is that the mere
proof of a so-called "accident" raises no presumption of negligence.
But where the thing from which the injury results is in the control of the defendant, and the accident is of a sort which in the
normal course of events wold not be occasioned by the thing if
properly managed, here is a presumption, or ground for a reasonable inference, of negligence on the part of the defendant.' In such
cases, res ipsa loquitur-the thing speaks for itself; that is to say,
if there is nothing to explain or rebut the inference that arises from
2Scott v. London & St. K. Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 50 (Eng. i865).
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the way in which the thing happened, it may fairly be found to
have been occasioned by negligence." Thus the burden of producing
the facts is cast upon the defendant, which is indeed justified, because in such cases the power to produce the evidence in question
re--s exclusively in him. To place such a burden on the plaintiff
would be to demand that he procure from the camp of the enemy the
evidence upon which his rights as a litigant depend. When the defendant produces evidence of what took place, he is not compelled
by most courts to go further and establish his innocence. " The -risk
of persuasion" remains with the plaintiff.
In Pennsylvania, however, the burden of proof, in the primary
sense, shifts to the defendant, who must by a preponderance of evidence prove his conduct was not negligent.' Although not supported by textwriters nor by most courts, such a rule, particularly
in those cases to which the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is restricted in Pennsylvania, seems to workwell in practice. The temptation to the defendant, to satisfy the burden of producing evidence by stating merely such facts as are favorable to
him and holding back the rest, is obviated. A real suspicion is cast
upon his conduct, which he must explain satisfactorily or pay for in
damages.
Inasmuch as the effect given the doctrine in Pennsylvania places
upon the defendant a greater burden than in most jurisdictions, we
should naturally expect the application to be more limited, and- such
is the case. The tendency of the courts of this state has been toapply the doctrine only to those cases where -an absolute duty, or
an obligation practically amounting to that of insurer, exists. Thus
it is applied to the case of a passenger, to whom the common carrier owes the duty of exercising the highest degree of care and skill.
Even here the history of the doctrine has been one of growing restricted application. As applied to carriers the doctrine was first
announced in very general terms in Laing v. Colder,' in which the
court said that "the mere happening of an injurious accident" to a
passenger, while in the hands of the carrier, "raises, prima faie, a
presumption of neglect, and throws upon the carrier the onus of
bhowing it did not exist." For some years this rule was .applied
quite freely. Thus an injury to a passenger resulting from a train
running into a cow unlawfully on the railroad track, cast a presumption of negligence upon the carrier.' Toward the end of the
last century, however, it was definitely settled that the rule of Laing

'See "The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden
of Proof"--Prof. F. H. Bohlen, 68 U. OF PA. LAw REviEw 3o7.
2 Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 57 L Ed. 815 (1912).
4 Baran v. Reading Iron Co., 2o2 Pa. 274, 5r Atl. 979 (r902).
'8 Pa. 479. 49 Am. Dec. 533 (1848).

'Sullivan v. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 3o Pa. 234, 72 Am. Dec. 698

(1858).
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v. Colder is restricted to cascs in which it is clearly shown "that the
injury complained of resulted from the breaking of machinery, collision, derailment of cars, or something improper or unsafe in the
conduct of the business, or in the appliances of transportation." "
The doctrine thus limited is usually strictly construed in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court, for example, held it inapplicable where
the accident was to the passenger and not to the car, even though
the injury resulted from a jolt chargeable to the manner of coupling
the car.8 Similarly there was held to be no presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier where a passenger was killed by u
huge rock falling from a hillside, adjacent to the right of way, upon
a passing train.' The decision in the latter case seems to show a reversal of attitude on the part of the court, subsequent to the time
when it decided the case of the cow on the track, referred to above.
The basis for applying the doctrine in these cases is the contract
on the part of the railroad to carry safely, hence the reason falls
and the doctrine does not apply as between the carrier and its employee. The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to master and servant cases has been persistently denied in Pennsylvania.-0
In cases where there is no absolute duty owed, nor any duty as
insurer, the Pennsylvania courts have been even more loath to apply
the doctrine of rcs ipsa loquitur. Until quite recently it seemed
essential, in such cases, to prove exclusive control in the defendant,
and the fact that a contractual relation existed between the parties."1 The high water mark of restricted application was reached
under the leadership of Chief Justice MAitchell, who on one occasion
characterized the doctrine as "dangerous and uncertain at best," 1and who held that it ought never to be applied except where it both
supports the conclusion contended for and reasonably excludes every

other.1'

In recent years there seems to have been an unmistakable tendency on the part of the courts of Pennsylvania to apply the doctrine
more liberally wherever the element of exclusive control in the defendant can be shown 1
Indicative of this trend is a dictum conT
Thomas v. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., i48 Pa. I8, 23 Atl. 989 (x892);
Ginn v. Penna. R. I. Co., 2m Pa. 557, 69 AtL 992 (19o8).
'Herstine v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 15I Pa. 244, 25 At. i4 (x892).
'Fleming v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. Louis Ry., 158 Pa. i3o, 27 AtL 858
(1$93).
"L R. A. 1917 E, p. iSo cites many cases on this point.
nShafer v. Lacock. Hawthorn & Co, z68 Pa. 497. 32 Atl. 44 (1895);
Stearns v. Ontario Spinning Co.. 184 Pa. 519. 39 Atl. _92 (188) ; Alexander
v. Maryland Steel Co., 189 Pa. 582, 42 Atil. 286 (i899).
'Allen v. Kingston Coal Co., 212 Pa. 54, 6z Atl. 572 (i905).
nZahniser el al. v. Penna. Torpedo Co.. 19o Pa. 350, 4-? Atl. 707 (I899).
"Hauer v. Erie C. Electric Co.. ST Pa. Super. 613 (1912); Rafferty v.
Davis. 26o Pa. 563, 1o3 AtL 95i (1918).
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taincd in a recent case,1" in which the deceased was employed by
a manufacturing concern to unload a coal car on a private siding.
A train of box cars; standing on the same track at the top of a
grade, were improperly coupled with an engine by the employees of
the defendant, and ran by force of gravity into the coal car, killing
the-deceased. The court said the case seemed to be one to which
the doctrine of rcs ipsa loquitur might be applied. It is interesting
to note that there existed in this case no absolute duty, no obligation
as insurer, aind no contractual relation-there was merely a duty to
use reasonable care-and yet the Supreme Court considered the doctrine applicable.
Although apparently gaining in favor with the Pennsylvania
courts, yet the general doctrine of rcs ipsa loquitur remains greatly
limited in its application in this State, 6 and must necessarily remain
so because of the unusual burden it casts upon the defendant in
this jurisdiction. It is submitted, however, that the more liberal
attitude recently manifested by our Supreme Court is justified by
the increased dangers to the public under existing industrial conditions, and is consonant with enlightened jurisprudence in other
jurisdictions.
A.B. V.B.
,
S
THE SITUS OF STOCK EXCIHANGE

SENTS

FOR PURPOSES

OF

TAXATIN.-It is not a violation of the Due Process Clause (of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution) for a State
to tax a resident on his seat in a Stock Exchange in another state,
according to the case of Anderson v. Durr, recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court.' Anderson, being taxed in-Ohio, his
domicile, on his seat in the New York Stock Exchange, petitioned
for an injunction on the ground that the privilege of membership
in the Exchange is so inseparably connected with specific real estate in
New York that its taxable situs must be regarded as not within the
jurisdiction of the State of Ohio. His-contention found favor in the
sight of Mr.justiceHolmes, who said that the foundation and substance
of the plaintiff's right was the right to enter the building and do business there, which right was localized in New York; and that, standing like an interest in land, it should be taxable only by that State.
The majority held, however, that the membership is personal property, and having no fixed situs, has a taxable situs at the domicile of
the owner. The case involves three interesting questions: (x) Is
such a membership taxable property? (2) What is its proper situs
"Di Iordio v. Director General of Railroads, 27o Pa. 111, 112 AtL 747
(1921).
"Douds v. Beaver Valley Traction Co., 54 Pa. Super. 477 (1913); Fitz-

patrick v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564. to9 At. 653 (192D).
'No. 27, Oct. Term, igzi. Decided Nov. 7th, 1921.

,VOTES

for taxation when it is owned by a non-resident? (3) If its situs
is wrongly fixed, will the Supreme Court interfere under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
The courts differ widely in their answer to the first question.2
Some courts take the view that a membership in a Stock Exchange,
Board of'Trade, -or other similar organization, is not property- at
all, but a mere personal privilege.3 The chief reason given is that
the holder is unable to transfer a title which can be insisted upon
and enjoyed against the consent of the association. The answer to
this position is that this quality is a consequence affecting the value
of a membership, not its existance as property. The fact that Anderson, in the principal case, paid $6o,ooo .for his seat indicates that
this quality is not as serious bar to its value. One court compares it
to membership in a Masonic lodge, and to the license of an attorney
or physician to practice ;4 but it is evident that such rights, while
they may be valuable and costly, are not transferrable, and do not
have a market value, as does a seat in a Stock Exchange. Most
courts hold that such a membership is property, at least for some
purposes. For instance, a seat has been held to be property within the
'The essential features of the rights of membership should be noted in
this connection. The New York Stock Exchange is a voluntary association
of xioo members, governed by its own constitution,-by-laws and rules, and
holding the beneficial ownership of all the capital stock of the New York
corporation which holds the building and land, worth $5,ooo,0o0. A member
has the privilege of transacting a brokerage business in securities listed upon
the Exchange, but may personally buy or sell only in the Exchange building.
Admissions to membership are made on the vote of the Committee on Adinissions. Membership may be transferred only upon the approval of the
transfer by the committee, and the proceeds are applied first to pay charges
against the retiring members arising from the rules of the Exchange, any surplus being paid to him. Business is transacted by members on account of
other members at a commission materially less than that charged to non-

members.

The rules of other Stock Exchanges are substantially similar.
'Thompson v. Adams, 93 Pa. 55 (i879), where a seat in the Philadelphia
Board of Brokers was held not to be property in the sense that one who
furnished the money for a deceased member to buy his seat could recover
what it sold for. Dictum: "A seat is not property in the eye of the law."
Pancoast v. Gowen, 93 Pa. 66 (1879). A seat in a board of brokers is
not subject to attachment execution "It is not property at all, but a mere
personal privilege, perhaps more accurately, a license to buy and sell at the
meetings of the board." Criticized in Page v. Edmunds, 187 U. S. 596, 47 L
Ed. 318 (1903), but recognized as still the law in Pennsylvania by Gartner v.
Pittsburgh Stock Exchange, 247 Pa. 482. 93 Atl. 759 (1915).
Barclay v. Smith, x07 1I. 349 (1883). Cf. Weaver v. Fisher, nio IIl

146 (1884).

Lowenberg v. Greenebaum, g Cal. T62, 33 Pac. 794 (1893), where a seat
in the San Francisco Stock Exchange was held not to be subject to levy and
sale on execution, being "a mere personal privilege of being and remaining a
member of a voluntary association."
San Francisco v. Anderson, io3 Cal. 69, 36 Pac. 1o34 (1895).
I Barclay v. Smith, jupra.
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bankruptcy laws;' within the reach of creditors ;' and pledgable as
collateral security for a debt.' As to whether it is property for the
purpose of taxation, there is again a conflict among those States
which treat it as property for the purposes mentioned above. Most
of the courts take the position that while a membership is a species
of property for some purposes, yet it is not of such a nature that
the terms usually found in tax laws embrace it. Hence it is not
taxable under the present laws of 'Maryland' and. New York.9 On
the other hand, the Minnesota -Supreme Court had no difficulty in
deciding that a membership in the Duluth Board of Trade was
taxable under a statute taxing "all personal property," 10 and the
United States Supreme Court assumed the point in a case concerning a seat in the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce."1
Assuming that a membership is taxable property, the second
question concerns the situs for taxation when the Exchange is located in one state and the holder of the membership is domiciled in
another. The general rule is that intangible personal property is
taxable at the domicile of the owner 12 and nowhere else,' 3 under the

'Hyde v. Woods, 94 U. S. 423, z4 L Ed. 2o4 (1876); Sparhawk v.
Yerkes, 42.U. S. 1, 35 L Ed. 915 (i89i); Page v. Edmunds, supra, holding
that a seat in the Philadelphia Stock Exchange is property "which could have
been by any means transferred," within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.
In re Ketchum, I Fed. 84o (D. C. i88o); In re Warder, io Fed. 275 (D.
C. 1882).

Ritterband v. Baggett, 4 Abb. N. C. 67 (N. Y. I8-); Londharn v.

White, 67 How. Pr. 467 (N. Y. 1884); Platt v. Jones, 96 N. Y. 24 (1884),
the latter holding that membership in the New York Stock Exchange was
property and passed to the assignee in bankruptcy. But see Belton v. Hatch,
iog N. Y. s93, 17 N. E. 225 (1888), where the assignee could not recover
the price of a seat sold by the association. While property, the seat is sub;
ject to the rules of the association.
'Grocers Bank v. Murphy, 6D How. Pr. 426 (N. Y. z88r).
'Powell v. Waldron, 89 N. Y. 328 (1882), where a membership in the
New York Cotton Exchange was pledged as collateral security and redeemed
by the receiver of the member.
'Baltimore v. Johnson, 96 Md. 737, 54 Atl. 646 (19o3).
*Peope ex reL Lemmon v. Feitner, 167 N. Y. i, 6o N. E. 265 (xgox).
In the case of In re Glendenning, 171 N. Y. 684. 64 N. E. 121 (2903),
affirming 67 App. Div. 125, a stock exchange membership was held to be
capital invested in business to the extent that its transfer could be taxed under
a transfer tax law relating to the devolution of property by will or intestacy. This case is cited as authority that a membership is taxable in New
York. That is true only to the extent indicated. The court expressly recognized that a membership is not personal property within the taxing law.
" Minnesota v. McPhail. 124 Minn. 398, 145 N. W. io8 (i9T4).
"Rogers v. Hennepin Co., 24o U. S. i84, 69 L Ed. _;%(1926).
"Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 42 Conn. 426; affirmed in ioo U. S. 49r, 25
L Ed. 558 (z879); Scripps v. Board of Review, 183 IlL 278, 55 N. E. 7oo
(889).
" Bonds. at least, are not taxable at the s$tus of a debtor. Case of State
Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 30D, 21 L. Ed. 179 (U. S. z872) ; Fores-

-VOTES

maxim niobilia scquzntur personain. An exception has been recognized where the property of a non-resident-usually an investmentis controlled by a resident agent having in his possession the evidence of indebtedness. In such a case, the property is said to have
a business situs and to be taxable in the State where the agent carries on the business. 4 The State of the domicile of the owner, or
creditor, cannot tax the intangible property in such a case, according to a Kansas decision," else the fundamental prindTple upon
which taxation is based would be ignored. That principle is that
taxation and protection are correlative terms. "Protection to that
portion of property not taken or absorbed by the tax is the compensation for all legitimate taxation. The taxation of persons in
respect to business or interests beyond the territory and jurisdiction of Kansas and which the laws of the state could in no way
reach or protect would be spoilation or confiscation." The above
language, though- applied to fiotes, is equally applicable, it would
seem, to membership in a Stock Exchange held by a non-resident of
the state where the Exchange is located. Such a membership should
clearly come within the exception to the general rule as to intangible
property. In the only cases on this point in which Stock Exchange
memberships were in question, the Minnesota Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court have held that it is proper to tax
such a membership where it is located,16 .though the holder be a
non-resident. It seems proper, then, that il the principal case, Ohio
should have refused to tax the seat in the New York Exchange.
The business in question was localized in New York, and could
have been made taxable there. But Ohio did tax it, and the Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed it. That brings us to the third question.
Whether a state should refuse to tax intangible personal property which is properly taxable in another State is an entirely different question from whether the Federal Supreme Court will declare
a tax in those circumstances unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The tendency is to allow the State Court to determine
such a question.Y Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that a
statute taxing a resident on bonds secured by a mortgage on lands
in another-state was not a taking without due process of law,1" on
man v. Byrne, 68 Ind. 247 (1879); Hayward v. Board of Review, 189 IlL
234, 59 N. E. 6ox (190).
" Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. i52 (1849); Mo. v. St. Louis Co. Ct., 47 Mo.

594 (187i); Herron v. Keeran, 59 Ind. 472 (1877) ; Redmond v. Commrs., 87
N. C. 122 (1882); In rc Jefferson, 35 Minn. 215, 28 N. W. 256 (t886); Fimch
v. York Co., 19 Neb. so (1886); Walker v. Jack, 88 Fed. 576 (C.C.A. 1898) 1
Matzenbach v. People, 14 Ill. iog, 62 N. E. S46 (go2).
"Fisher v. Commrs. of Rush Co., 19 Kan. 414 (1877).

"Rogers v. Hennepin Co., note ii, supra.
u Cooley on Taxation, sec. 6.
5
Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, note 12, supra.
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the ground that a debt has its situs for taxation at the creditor's
residence; while the same court affirmed the constitutionality of a
statute taxing a mortgage held by a non-resident of the taxing
state." These decisions indicating that a mortgage can be taxed
in both the state of the mortgagee and the state where the land is
situated are precedents for holding that a membership in a Stock
Exchange is taxable both in the state where the Exchange is located,
as in Rogers v. Hennepin County,20 and in the state where the owner
is domiciled, as in the principal case.
The difficulty arises when one considers the nature of the Stock
Exchange membership. Surely it is as much localized in the State
of New York as if it were rolling stock of a transit corporation;
yet in the case of Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky,2 ' it was held contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to tax a transit company for
its tangible personal property permanently out of the jurisdiction.
The difficulty is not evaded by calling the one kind of property
tangible and the other intmgible, when it is remembered that intangible personal property may acquire a definite business situs in a state
where its owner is not domiciled. It would seem that the real
nature of the property should determine, and that once it is held
that a seat has a situs for taxation in the state where it is located, a
further taxing in the State where the owner is domiciled should be
held to come within the principle of the Union Transit Co. case,
and be held unconstitutional. That principle is: "It is essential to
the validity of a tax that an equivalent be rendered to the taxpayer
in protection of person or property. If the property is in another
state to which it may be said to look for protection, then the taking
is without due process of law."
L. H. McK.
SEIZURE ON EXECUTION PROCESS OF PROPERTY HELD IN BAIL-

MENT.-The common law rule in many states was that a judgment
obtained against the defendant would not entitle the sheriff on execution process to seize and sell that person's personal property in
the hands of a bailee who had an interest therein. The bailee had a
qualified property right in the goods, and any seizure by the sheriff
was a violation of that right, for which an action of trespass would
lie., The sheriff had the right, however, to sell the bailor's reversionary interest, in which case the purchaser acquired the property
,Savings Society v. Multnomah Co., I69 U. S. 42T, 42 L. Ed. 803 (x8).
"See note it, supra.
Union Transit Co. v. Ky., 199 U. S. 211, 50 L Ed. 15o (19o5).

Strodes v. Caven, 3 Watts 258 (Pa. 1834); Wheeler v. McFarland, to
Wend. 318 (N. Y. 1833); Sexton v. Monks. i6 Mo. x56 (1852); Mower v.
Stickney, 5 Minn. 397, (1861), semble.

XOTES

subject to the satisfiction of the bailee's claims.' But for the purposes of this sale, it would seem that the sheriff was 'not permitted
to take possession of the property, since the sale was made subject to the bailee's prior right to retain possession until his interest
had been satisfied.' It was not a sale of the property, but rather a
sale of the right to obtain the property upon satisfying the legitimate demands of the bailee. The rule would be different, of course,
where the bailee had no interest in the thing bailed, as for example,
where he was a mere gratuitous bailee. The principle underlying
the above case is that the bailee is clothed with such an interest in
the property as will entitle h;m to bring trespass against a stranger,
or even against the owner himself.4 llut where the bailee has no
interest in the property there is no reason why the above rule should
apply.
In 'the recent case of Trainer v. Saunders - an execution was
issued against the defendant and a levy was made by the sheriff on
the contents of a safe deposit box rented by him and held in the
vault of the Columbia Avenue Trust Company. The trust company
refused to permit the sheriff to open the box, whereupon the plaintiff petitioned the court that the defendant in execution be compelled
to open it. The court held that it was without power to grant this
order and pointed out that the proper method of procedure was-that
provided by the act of 1836,c which stipulated that property of a
person in the hands of a bailee should be liable to sale on execution,
subject to the bailee's rights therein. A bill of discovery might
-have been brought to force the defendant to disclose the contents
of the box,7 but the only method to obtain the goods was for the
sheriff to get them from the trust company, -which was holding them
as bailee. The court, however, recognized that the statute did not
give the sheriff an absolute right to seize the goods, but it rather
reiterated the common law rule that the sheriff had the right to
levy on the property subject to the bailee's right to possession.

' Strodes v. Caven, supra, note * ; Bakewell v. Ellsworth, semble, infra,
note 8; Tidd's Practice (Pa. 2nd ed. io42).
'Tidd's Practice, supra, note 2; New York passed a statute changing
the common law in this respect, see note 8, infra.
'Cowling v. Snow, ix Mass. 415 (1814).
'Trainer v. Saunders, 27o Pa. 45, 113 Sh. 681 (igur).
'Act of June 16th, 1836, P. L. 755, sec. 23.
'Act of June 16th, 1836, P. L 755, sec. 9-i8; Act of May 9, 1913, P. L.
197.

' Many states have statutes covering the general problem as to the right

of the sheriff to levy on goods in the hands of a bailee. See the following
cases: Hass v. Prescott, 38 Wis. 146 (1875); Pomeroy v. Smith, 17 Pick. 85
(Mass. 1835); People's Bank v. Wheedon, ii5; Ga. 782, 42 S. E. 91 (19o2);
Hoffman v. The Knickerbocker Trust Company. 157 App. Div. 434, 142 N. Y.
S. 445 (1g3) ; Reichenbach v. McKeahan, 95 Pa. 432 (i88o); Waverly Coal
Co. v. McKennan, 11o Pa. 599 (1885).
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Thus they said "when the levy is made, reasonable opportunity
should be given to the safe deposit company to assert any special
rights which it may possess as bailee, but if there is a refusal to permit the opening of the box without proper excuse, the right may,
under the law, e enforced." It would seem that if the trust company had a property interest in the contents of the box the sheriff
would only have been permitted to sell the bailor's reversion.
In case the trust company refused to let the sheriff into possession without any justifiable cause, the court was of the opinion
that the sheriff would be entitled forcibly to enter and take possession of the contents of the box. The common law rule was that an
officer could not break open the outer door of defendant's dwelling
for the purpose of levying on lis goods.'
This was due to the
common law's jealousy of any intrusion on the domestic peace and
tranquility of a person's home. But the rule applied only to a person's dwelling house, the law being unwilling to grant a similar
immunity to goods located elsewhere, and thus it has been held that
an officer can break into a barn or outhouse 10 and also that he can
forcibly enter a store which is unconnected with the dwelling and
which does not form part of the curtilage.11 It was on this theory
that the court said the sheriff would be permitted to use force if
necessary to gain possession of the box, provided, of course, there
was no interest on the part of the trust company in the goods held
by them, and in the light of previous authorities this would seem to
be correct.
The Pennsylvania court had ample precedent for holding that
the lessor of a safe deposit vault is a bailee of the contents of the
vault, even though the lessor did not have access to the vault and
could only open it when his key was used in conjunction with that
of the lessee.'2 The court, therefore, properly said the case was
In New York there is an interesting development. The common law rule
was that a sheriff could not seize goods in the hands of a bailee who had an
interest in them. The legislature passed a statute which changed this rule
to some extent and provided that goods in the hands of a pledgee could be
seized, by the sheriff, exhibited for the purposes of the sale of the
peldgor's reversionary right and then returned to the possession of the
pledges. Sec. 2 R. S. (N. Y.) 29o. 2nd ed., sees. 20 and 23. See also Bakewell v. Ellsworth, 6 Hill 484 (N. Y. 834). The statute was superseded by
the civil code, sec. 1412, which provides that the pledgor's Interests should be
sold in the hands of the pledgee by virtue of an execution against the property, the purchaser acquiring the right to take possession only upon compliance with the terms and conditions on which the pledgor could have obtained the property.
'Keith v. Johnson, I Dana (Ky.) 665 (883) ; Illsley v. Nichols, 12 Pick
27o (Mass. 1831); Hooker v. Smith. i9Vt 151 (x846).
"Burton v. Wilkinson. i8Vt 186 (846).
" Stearns v. Vincent So Mich. 2o9, 15 N. IV. 86 (1883).
" Reading Trust Co. v. Thompson, 254 Pa. 33. 98 At. 953 (1916. Lockwood v. The 'Manhattan Storage Company. 29 App. Div. 68, So N. Y. S.
974 (1898); Deposit Company v. Stead, 25o Ill. 584, 93 N. E. 973 (igt).

NOTES
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"

. governed by the act *of 1836, and pointed out the correct procedure under that statute. The case illustrates an interesting point
in practice and gives an opportunity to compare the Pennsylvania
method with that used in other jurisdictions.
I'. H. N.
BURDEN OF PROOF OF CHIARAcTER OF EMPLOYMENT IN
-MEN'S COMPENSATION CAss.-A brakeman, on duty on

VORK-

a train

which it was -agreed carried both interstate and intrastate commerce,
and was therefore an interstate traffic movement,' was caught between two of the cars of this train and killed. Suit was brought by
-the brakeman's widow under the Pennsylvania Vorkmen's Compensation Act. The state referee held thiat it was incumbent upon
the defendant carrier to show that, when this man was killed, he
was engaged in the performance of his duties as a member of this
interstate train crew and that he had not been detached from such
duties and sent upon some possible errand of a purely intrastate
character. In due course this ruling of the referee was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, reversed
&3
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Justice McKenna, in
delivering the opinion of the court, said, "We cannot accede to the
view that there is a presumption that duties performed on a train
of interstate and intrastate commerce were performed in the latter commerce. The presumption indeed might be the other way."
And again, "If there be an assertion of a claim or remedy growing
out of an occurrence in which there are constituents of interstate
commerce, the burden of explanation and avoidance is on him who

asserts the claim or remedy, not on the railway company to which it
is directed."

The tendency of the recent decisions of the Supreme.Court of
the United States has been toward regarding as interstate in char-

acter any employment in which a part of the duties are of such
character and where the nature of the employment is such that it

cannot be readily and obviously divided into successive periods of interstate and intrastate service.4 Nothing in these decisions, how-=Note 6, supra.
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. i. 56 L. Ed. 327 (1912) ; N.
Y. Central R. R. v. Winfield, 24 U. S.147, 6x L Ed. 043 (1917).
" Polk v. Philadelphia & Reading R. R., 266 Pa. 335, 109 AtL 627 (1920).

" Philadelphia & Reading R. R.v. Polk, 6i Sup. Ct. 63o (U. S. ig2).
'Southern R. R. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, 61 L Ed. 1321 (917); N.
Y. Central R.R. v. Porter, 249 U. S. 168, 63 L.Ed. 536 (i919); Phila., B. &
W. R. R. v. Smith, 25o U. S. ioT, 63 L, Ed. 869 (igg); Phila. & Reading
R. R. v. Di Donato, 6s Sup. Ct. 628 (U. S. 1921). In this last case the deceased was a watchman at a railroad crossing. Both interstate and intrastate traffic passed this crossing. The court refused to consider a division of
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ever, repudiates the principle announced in that line of decisions of
which Illinois Central Railroad v. Pehrens is a typical example. In
that case it was held that where an employee is injured while serving as a member of a train crew, the character of his employment
depends upon the nature of the traffic carried by that train. So if
an employee is injured while repairing rolling stock in a repair
shop, the character of his employment is interstate only if the particular car which he is repairing has been, at the time of the repairs, definitely assigned to interstate traffic.' Under the Behrens
case,T therefore, it is not enough merely to show that a brakeman
or conductor is a member of a shifting crew which during the day
handles a number of trains, some interstate and some intrastate.
His day's work, viewed as a whole, deals with both kinds of traffic,
and, since that work is easily divisible into specific and clearly
divided periods, his employment is held to shift in character as the
train which he is switching either does, or does not, carry interstate
traffic. The case of Philadelphia and Reading R. R. v. Polk' deals
with this sort of an employment. There is language used, however,
in the course of the opinion which may lead to the idea that wherever a train-hand's duties require him to pass from dealing with
the one to the other form of traffic, the burden rests upon the claimant to show the precise nature of the traffic in which the injured
employee was engaged at the time of the accident. Does it in fact
establish such a doctrine?
It is necessary to revert to the facts of the Polk' case and
the language of the court therein, to ascertain whether that language
was intended to have so broad a meaning. The agreed facts were
that the brakeman was killed while employed upon a train which
was carrying interstate traffic. Therefore, under the Behrens ,o
case his employment on and about that train was itself interstate in
character. If this fact is borne in mind, the statement of Mr. Justice McKenna that, "If there be an assertion of a right or remedy
growing out of an appearance in which there are constituents of interstate commerce, the burden of explanation and avoidance is on
him who asserts the claim or remedy, not on the railway company
this watchman's time but held him engaged in interstate commerce. The court

stated, "To separate his [watchman's] duties by moments of time or particular incidents of its exertion would be to destroy its unity and commit
it to confusing controversies."
a233 U. S. 473, s8 L Ed. zo5i (1914).

"Minn. & St. L R. R. v. Winters, 242 U. S. 353, 61 L.Ed. 358 (1917).
See also Boyle v. P.R. R., 228 Fed. 266 (C. C. A. i96); Chicago, R. L
& P. R. R. v. Ind. Board, 273 IlL 528, 113 N. E. 8o (1916).
'Note s, supra.
'Note 3, supra.
'Notes 2 and 3,supra.

"Note

,

supra.

NOTES

to which it is directed," is seen to be appropriate to the facts, limited to them, and not intended to go beyond them. The admitted
facts show that the brakeman was employed upon an interstate train
and that he suffered from an accident which was sustained during
the performance of the ordinary duties of a brakeman on such a
train. It seems evident, therefore. that it should be incumbent
upon the claimant to take him out of this employment, into which
the agreed facts had placed him.
I lad there been no agreement as to the character of the traffic
carried by the train on which the brakeman was employed when
killed, the Polk case would have raised a question of great importance upon which there is a conflict of authority in the state decisions
and as to which the only United States Supreme Court decision "
is not conclusive. In an action brought in a state court by an employee of an interstate carrier, either under the common law or
the statute law of the state, upon whom rests the burden of establishing the nature of the traffic which such train was carrying?
Upon the answer to that question depends the interstate or intrastate character of the injured workmen's employment.. Must the
injured man prove that the train was not engaged in interstate commerce in order to establish his right to recover under the state law?
Or must the common carrier show that the train did carry interstate commerce in order to oust the jurisdiction of the state court?
The majority of state courts 12 hold that the employee has made
out a prima facic case by showing an injury falling within the terms
of the state compensation act. The defendant carrier must, therefore, plead and prove facts which show that the employment was
interstate in character, and hence within the exclusive control of
the Federal Employer's Liability Act. New Jersey alone holds tothe contrary. "

It is submitted that the very nature of the respective powers
under which the Federal Liability Act was passed and under which
Osborne v. Gray, 241 U. S. 16, 6o L Ed. 865 (x916).
u Erie Railroad v. Welsh, 89 Ohio 8, xos N. E. 189 (1913); Chicago R.
I. and P. R. R. v. McBee, 45 Okla. 192, 145 Pac. 331. (1914); Zavitovsky v.
Chicago, M. & St. Paul R. R., i61 Wis. 461, i54 N. W. 954 (1915); Chicago,
R. I. and P. R. R. v. Industrial Board of Ill., 273 IlL 528, 113 N. E. 8o
(1916); Terry v. Southern Pac. R. R., 34 Cal. App. 330, 169 Pac. 86 (1917);
Ill. C. R. R. v. Industrial Board, 284 111. 267, ii9 N. E. 920 (198); A.,
T. & S. F. R. R. v. Industrial Comm., 290 Ill. 59, 125 N. E. 38o (i919);
Chicago & A. R. R. v. Industrial Comm., 290 Ill. 599, 125 N. E. 378 (i919);
Rockford City T. Co., v. Industrial Comm., -95 11. 358, 129 N. E. 135 (192D).
The New York Compensation Act has an express provision that there is
a presumption that the claimant comes within the provisions of the act. N.
Y. ConsoL Laws, C. 67, sec. 21. Fish v. Rutland R. R., 189 App. Div. 352, 175
N. Y. S. 439 (i9g); Saccomanno v. Grass River R. R., 191 App. Div. 761,
182 N. Y. S. 23 (192o).

"Lincks v. Erie R. R., 91 N. J. L T66,

1o3

At. 176 (igi); Car-

berry v. D., L & V. R. R., 93 N. J. L, 414, io8 AtL 364 (1919).
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-state compensation statutes were enacted, support the majority view.
The power of a state to determine by- judicial decision interpreting
its common law, or by legislative enactment, the rights and liabilities arising out of industrial accidents, is not conferred upon the
state by its own or by the Federal- Constitution. It is a power which
is inherent from its right to regulate the relation of its citizens inter
se. It is unlimited except as it has been restricted by its own or
the Federal Constitution. On the other hand the power of Congress
to legislate on the subject is incidental to its delegated power to
regulate commerce between the states and with foreign nations."
Congress has no power to legislate in regard to industrial accidents
as such. Its power is conditional upon the injury having been
sustained in the course of interstate commerce. It is not enough
that the employer was engaged in interstate commerce. Both employer and employee must be engaged in interstate commerce at
the time of the accident before it comes within the power of Congress. 15 It would, therefore, seem that one who asserts that the
otherwise complete and sovereign power of a state to regulate matters of local concern is superseded or suspended in a particular case
by an Act of Congress, must show that the case falls within that
field over which power has been delegated to Congress. Otherpurporting to deal with
wise the Act of Congress, though expressly
it, would be invalid and unconstitutional 2
The Polk case 1T may create doubt and uncertaintly because of
the language used by the court in the course of its opinion. The
actual decision, however, is limited to the facts as indicated. It does
not decide or touch upon the important constitutional question as
to the locus of the burden of proof of the character of the employment of a man injured or killed in the service of an interstate corrier, when relief is sought in the courts of the state in which the
injury or death occurred.1s
P.A.M.
"Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section &
Second Employers" Liability Cases, note x, supra; Pedersen v. D. L
& NV. R. R., 229 U. S. x46, 57 L Ed. 125 (1913); Illinois Central R. R. v.

Behrens, note

, supmra.

"It may be pointed out that the Employers' Liability Act is no more
paramount over a WVorkmen's Compensation Act than it is over the common
law of a state. It is true that practically all compensation laws are administered by commissions whose judicial power is limited to cases falling within
the terms of such acts. It is submitted, however, that this fact does not
make the question of the interstate or intrastate character of an accident one
of the jurisdiction of the particular tribunal chosen by the state to administer the act. The question still remains one as to the respective powers of
the state and national governments.
'Note 3, jupra.
"In a recent case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in following the
Polk case, overruled its previous decisions on this question. Scanlon v. Payne,
271 Pa. 391 (192I).

NOTES
TnE EFFECT OF A PLEDGE BY A GRATUITOUS BAILEE.-The law

of pledges might well be considered one of the best-settled branches
of the common law; yet the authorities yield little assistance toward
a solution of the problems presented by a recent case in the English Court of Appeals." In this case the plaintiff handed jewelry to
one -Miller,under an arrangement whereby he might examine it and
decide whether he would make a loan to the plaintiff on the security
of the jewelry. Miller then pawned the jewelry with the defendant,
who took it in good faith and advanced 1xooo io Miller. Two days
later, 'Miller arranged with the plaintiff to lend her i5oo, she giving
him her note for i6oo payable in six equal monthly instalments, and
allowing him, as she thought, to retain possession of the jewelry as
security for the payment of the note. Miller afterwards borrowed
£300 from one Berners, and deposited with him the plaintiff's note.
Miller committed suicide. The plaintiff paid Berners £4oo on the
note, with notice of the defendant's position, and sued the defendant for the return of the jewelry, making no tender to him. The
court held that the plantiff could not recover.
Since the plaintiff at no time gave Miller any other evidence
of the ownership of the jewelry than its bare possession, which is
never enough to estop the true owner of a chattel from setting up

3
his title, even against a purchaser 2 or pledgee in good faith, the
the
jewelry acquired
in
defendant's claim must be based on a right
by him, and not on any estoppel against the plaintiff. And since
any right in the jewelry acquiredby the defendant must have been
derived from Miller, the decision of the case must depend on the
effect of the transactions between the plaintiff and Miller. The
first question involved is therefore: what right in the jewelry, if
any, passed to Miller upon its delivery to him by the plaintiff?
The court took the view that, although the delivery of the jewelry by the plaintiff to Miller constituted him a gratuitous bailee,
"itwas a good delivery for the purpose of creating a pledge whenever that pledge was created," and that the arrangement whereby
MIiller made the loan to the plaintiff "went to feed the defendant's
title." I
The court concedes that when the jewelry was delivered to
Miller, he became merely a gratuitous bailee, and not a pledgee.
If Miller had been a pledgee of the jewelry when he pawned it with
the defendant, Miller's pledgor, the .plaintiff, could not have recovered the jewelry from the defendant without tendering to him the

1Blhdell-ULigh v. Attenborough, 125 Law Times

. 386 (Eng. x92);

L R. (1921), K. B. 235 (C. A.).
ILevi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42 Am.Rep. 302 (1882).
"Cox v. McGuire, 26 I1. App. 315 (1887).
'Quotations from the opinion of Bankes, L. J.
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plaintiff's debt to Miller." And if Miller had simply retained possession of the jewelry, and later loaned money to the plaintiff with
the understanding that the jewelry was a pledge for repayment, the
agreement of pledge would clearly have been valid.0 But the plaintiff here undoubtedly had the right to reclaim the jewelry from Miller if no loan had been arranged between them; this plainly indicates that, instead of the contract of pledge relating back to the
delivery, the delivery must be taken to relate forward to the contract of pledge.' The contract of pledge, then, was completed only
when Miller made his loan to the plaintiff, because up to that moment the plaintiff might rightfully have refused to enter into such
a contract. It follows that when Miller pledged the jewelry to the
defendant and until Miller made his loan to the plaintiff, Miller
could have no greater rights in the jewelry than those of a gratuitous
bailee. So it would seem that 'Miller's pledge of the jewelry to the
defendant would terminate the bailment, and enable the plaintiff to
recover the jewelry at once.'
But the further questions must be considered: did the plaintiff
lose his right to possession of the jewelry, or did the defendant acquire a right to its possession as against the plaintiff by virtue of
Miller's loan to the plaintiff after Miller had pledged the jewelry to
the defendant?
To hold that the plaintiff lost his right to possession of the
jewelry by this transaction would be to maintain that the plaintiff,
by accepting a loan and intending to confer on Miller the right of a
pledgee to possession of the jewelry, has effected a valid contract
of pledge, although (i) the plaintiff did neither then nor afterwards
deliver the jewelry to Miller, and although (2) Miller was not then
in possession thereof. To adopt this conclusion would extend the
doctrine of "constructive delivery" of a pledge to a length which is
warranted by no previous decision and .sustained by no authority.'
sDonald v. Suckling, 35 L. J. Q. B. 23z (i876); Talty v. Freedmans' Savings & Trust Co., 93 U. S. 322, 23 L. Ed..886.(i8 76).
s Brown v. Warren, 43 N. H. 43o (x86z); Van Blarcorn v. Broadway
Bank, 9 Bosw. W (N. Y. i86z).
Delivery of the pledge to the pledgee has always been considered essential to the validity of a contract of pledge, 2 Kent Comm. 58r; Story, Bailments, s. 297; Bonsey v. Amee, 8 Pick. 236 (Mass. 1829), Thompson v. Andrews, 8 Jones 453 (N. C 1862) except where the pledgee was already in
possession, Brown v. Varren, supra; Van Blarcom v. Bank, supra: this was

called a "constructive delivery."
"If the pledgee has the thing already in possession, as by a deposit or a

loan, there the very contract transfers to him, by operation of law, a virtual possession thereof as a pledge, the moment the contract is completed."
Story, Bailments, s. 297.

' Cox v. McGuire, supra; Gottlieb v. Hartman, 3 CoL 53 (1876).
*See note 7, supra. The attempted pledge by the plaintiff to Millet
neither complies with the rule nor is embraced in the exception stated
therein. See also note 13, infra.
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It is submitted that such a change in the law of pledges is unwise,
since it complicates a transaction whose simplicity the law has
always aimed to preserve10
The only case cited by the court is Whitehorn Bros. v..DavisonI
In that case the plaintiffs sent a necklace to one Bruford
with a bill of sale to him, not intending to sell it to him, but intending that he should offer it to one of his clients; Bruford pledged
the necklace to the defendant, and told the plaintiffs he had sold
it as intended. Upon the plaintiffs' asking for payment, several interviewi took place between them and Bruford, as a result of which
the plaintiffs invoiced the necklace to Bruford and took time bills in
payment from him. The bills were dishonored, and the plaintiffs
sued the defendant for the return of the necklace. The court held
the plaintiffs could not recover.
The court in this case did not consider the first transaction
of the plaintiffs with Bruford as constituting a sale to him, but
viewed the subsequent invoice of the necklace to him, and taking of
bills from him, as a voidable sale, induced by Bruford's fraudulent
misrepresentations as to his client. Bruford, then, got a voidable
title to the necklace, but he got it after he had pledged the necklace
to the defendant; and the court states that the voidable title then
got by Bruford inured to the defendant's benefit and "would go to
feed the defendant's title." "'
Whitehorn Bros. v. Davison may be distinguished from the
principal case by the fact that in the former, Bruford clearly acquired a title, though a voidable one, in the necklace when it was
invoiced to him ;'S whereas in the latter, no authority supports the
view that Miller ever acquired a right to retain possession of the
jewelry as against the plaintiff.
.If the transaction referred to creates a valid contract of pledge, it
might be held that the defendant was entitled in equity to the plaintiff~s note,
Whitney v. Peay, 24 Ark. 2_ (1862). Whether or not Berners took the note
from Miller as a holder in due course does not appear. But he seems to
have been a holder of the note, since he collected the amount due thereon
from the plaintiff; and he gave £3oo for the note; therefore, it would appear
the court was bound to consider him a holder in due course, Bills of Exchange Act (45 & 46 Vict.. c. 6t, 1882), s. 2, 3o. Berners' equity in the note
is then superior to the defendant's, Kernohan v. Manss, 53 Ohio St. 118, 41
N. E 258 (1895), and le would be entitled to enforce payment of the note
against the plaintiff.
. (1911), 1IC. B. 463 (C. A.).
3 104 Law Times R. 234 (Eng. i9gi); L
" Quotations from the opinion of Buckley, L. J., io4 Law Times R. 24t

(1911).
"' From this it appears that Whitehorn Bros. v. Davison, supra, does not
support the proposition, that in the principal case the plaintiff effected a
valid pledge to Miller by merely accepting a loan from him and agreeing

that he should retain the jewelry as a pledge, after Miller had lost possession of the jewelry.

UXII ERSITY OF PEXXSYLI'A.JA LI..V REJJEIV

122

In both cases, however, the court maintains that the right acquired by the defendant's pledgor relates back to the time when he
first got possession of the chattel, and so inures to the defendant's
benefit, although the defendant's pledgor could transfer no valid
right to the defendant at the time of the pledge. This theory has
not heretofore been recognized in the law of personal property.
From the language of the opinions in both cases as to "feeding the
defendant's title," it would appear that the court is borrowing from
the law of real property the doctrine of "estoppel by deed." Under
this doctrine, a grantor of property to which he had no title was
estopped by the giving of his deed from setting up an after-acquired
title as against hi_ grantee1 4 In such cases, it has been inaccurately
said that the grantor's after-acquired title went to feed the grantee's title."1 The distinction between the effect of delivery of a deed
to realty, and delivery of possession of a chattel, even with a restricted power of sale,16 does not need to be pointed out. Both
WNhitehorn Bros. v. Davison"? and the principal case would
therefore seem to have been decided on a false analogy. And no
theory is perceived to justify a holding that the defendant acquired
a right to possession of the jewelry as against the plaintiff, in the
principal case, by virtue of Miller's loan to the plaintiff, after Miller
had pledged the jewelry to the defendant.
Moreover, a fact in the principal case unnoticed by the court
appears to establish the plaintiff's right of recovery beyond question:
before Miller committed suicide, he borrowed £3oo from Berners,
and deposited with Berners the plaintiff's note. The report does not
state whether by this transaction Miller purported to sell the note
to Berners, or merely to pledge it. However, it is stated that the
plaintiff paid Berners £4oo on account of the sum due on the note.
So it appears that Miller had transferred the plaintiff's debt to
Berners. It has been held that where a pledgee transferred the debt
the
for which the pledge was given as security, without transferring
1
pledge, the pledgor can recover the pledge from the pledgee, ' It is
submitted that this holding is sound, since under these circumstances
the pledgor remains liable for the debt to the pledgee's assignee, and
there can be no reason why the pledgee should retain possession of
the pledge. Under this view, the plaintiff would be entitled to reHannon v. Christopher, 34 N. . Eq. 459 (1881).
13Doe d. Christmas v. Oliver, io B. & C1i81 (Eng. 1829). Actually, the
grantee in such a case got no title, since he was allowed the option of
taking the land or of recovering the purchase money from his grantor,
after the grantor had acquired title. Resser v. Carney, 52 Minn. 397, 54 N. W.
89 0893). Tiffany, Real Property, s. 5452Heilbronn v. McAleenan, 46 N. Y. St. Rep. 457, 1 N. Y. S. 875
(I8).
104 Law Times R. 234 (Eng. x9ii) ; L. R. (191), x K. B. 463 (C. A.).
"Morgan v. Dugan. 3o AtL 558 (Md. x894).
3
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cover the jewelry from Miller, even though the plaintiff's acceptance
of the loan from Miller, and agreement that Miller should hold
the jewelry in pledge after he had parted with its possession be considered as completing a valid contract of pledge. Miller obviously
could have had no greater rights in the jewelry than those of a
pledgee; and a pledgee can transfer to a sub-pledgee, in the absence
of an estoppel against the pledgor,D only his own rights in the
pledger 0 Therefore it appears that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in any view of the case.
A. R.

c.

"McNeil v Tenth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. Rep. 34 (1871).
"Merchants' Bank v. Livingston, 74 N. Y. 223 (1878).

